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Detecting web application attacks is a task performed by many systems. An example of 
such a system is the open source tool NoScript, which will be discussed at various points 
in this work. Among these attacks, cross site scripting is a focus of this study, mainly due 
to the levels of concern related to it. The primary goal of this research is to analyze how 
efficiently a cross-site scripting attack once detected can be logged. Logging the attack 
has benefits from a Cyberforensics point of view. This work analyzes related efforts and 
the benefits of implementing such functionality. It was found that for the test system 
analyzed, there was an additional overhead. This overhead, though, was seen to be within 






CHAPTER 1. THE PROBLEM 
1.1. Introduction 
This research proposes a concept by means of which a browser can analyze 
incoming and outgoing web traffic and store this analysis. The concept of analyzing web 
traffic already exists, but efficient storage of this analysis would be helpful from a 
forensic standpoint. The capability of this system to store analysis on a centrally located 
machine can provide for ease of investigation. Analysis to be stored includes details of 
the cross-site scripting attack against the user. The study also focuses on the performance 
aspects of such systems. The task of analyzing web traffic is considered to be an 
important factor that decides the system performance. The goal is to have a storage 
technique that result in minimum overhead. 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
This research focuses on the following research question – Can a Firefox web 
browser efficiently log a cross-site scripting attack? 
1.3. Statement of Purpose 
This study analyzes browsers of the Firefox Version 3.0 category. The aim is to 
analyze the web page and identify a cross-site scripting attack against the user. For 
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example, consider the Javascript function eval (). Execution of eval () occurs at run time, 
typically with the help of a user input. In such cases, it is possible that an attacker can 
inject a malicious script within the eval () function. These attacks fall into the broad 
category of injection attacks. The study follows the testing guidelines and cheat sheet for 
cross-site scripting given by The Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP, 
2009). 
Efficiency in detection would be determined by the overhead caused due to the 
detection mechanism (i.e., the additional time it takes to load the web page). If the 
overhead is reduced, then the mechanism would be more efficient. Logging of the event 
is done if a cross-site scripting attack or vulnerability is detected. The ultimate goal of 
any web application security initiative is to protect the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of critical information. 
Once logged, the logs can be utilized for forensics. This study looks at two 
forensic analysis techniques that may be used for investigation. They are frequency 
analysis and semantic analysis. Frequency analysis in this study has been done on 
potentially malicious end hosts called by an attacker’s javascript code. The calls to the 
suspicious hosts have been ordered from highest to lowest frequency. Such an analysis 
can prove to be helpful in preventing any future attacks from these suspicious end hosts. 
A strong policy can also be developed with this information.  
Semantic analysis is used to analyze and check the log content for certain 
conditions to finally arrive at a conclusion. The conclusion can be drawn from a decision 
tree. The decision tree contains the course of action to be taken depending on whether the 
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condition is met or not. Both these analyses are explained in detail, within the context of 
this study in chapter 5. 
1.4. Significance of the Problem 
This thesis corroborates existing cross-site scripting detection techniques as well 
as provides a fresh approach for logging the analysis in real time, which can provide for 
better forensic analysis. A study in 2008 by the Web Application Security Consortium 
(WASC, 2008) found out that 39% of a total of 97,554 web application vulnerabilities are 
cross-site scripting that had a 38% probability of detection. It can be seen that cross-site 
scripting is a matter of concern in the real world, especially when dealing with the 
Payment Card Industry (PCI).  
Once cross-site scripting is detected, it is logged in a manner so that it can be used 
as evidence in the future. One hard challenge being faced in computer forensics is the 
reliability and the validity of the evidence that is collected and analyzed (Kessler, 2009). 
One factor for this is the use of different forensic tools, which give varying results. 
Logging a web application attack in real time, upon detection from the web browser has 
its advantages; mainly, integrity and accuracy of data. Investigating and law enforcement 
agencies are the main audiences who can be benefitted by this study. 
1.5. Definitions 
Availability – Ensure that necessary access to information is not disrupted unless it has 
been informed in advance (Paul, 2008). 
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Character Encoding – “Mapping between a character set and a range of binary numbers” 
(Roberts, Heller & Ernest, 1999, p. 377). Using this mapping, a potentially harmful 
character maybe replaced with the corresponding binary representation, which is less 
harmful. 
Computer Forensics – “A sub-discipline of Digital & Multimedia Evidence, which 
involves the scientific examination, analysis, and/or evaluation of digital evidence in 
legal matters” (SWGDE & SWGIT, 2009, p. 5). 
Confidentiality – Ensuring that only legitimate persons access information (Paul, 2008). 
Cross-Site Scripting – Running attacker’s malicious scripts in an unsuspecting user’s 
browser (Auger, 2009). 
Decision Tree – Decision tree is a system that “searches through data, eliminates those 
that conform to a known legitimate specification and highlights the exceptions” (Stallard 
& Levitt, 2003, p. 3). 
Frequency Analysis – In this work, frequency analysis refers to constructing a frequency 
table identifying the number of times a malicious end host was called and studying the 
frequency distribution by means of a bar chart. 
Integrity – Ensuring that there is no data alteration (Paul, 2008). 
Javascript – “Javascript is a lightweight interpreted programming language with object-
oriented capabilities” (Flanagan, 2006, p. 1). 
Semantic Analysis – Within the context of this work, a forensic system employing 
semantic analysis can be seen as a system that analyzes log content and abstracts the 
evidence based on some logic (Lin, 2008). 
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Web Browser – “A web browser is an application that finds and displays web pages” 
(McDowell, 2007). 
1.6. Assumptions 
Some assumptions of this work are as follows: 
 The developed extension is compatible with all versions of Firefox prior to 
version number 3.0.15. 
 The target audiences are those companies or businesses that want enhanced data 
protection measures or a more detailed investigation by law enforcement 
agencies. 
 The detection of cross-site scripting attack is accurate as existing methods would 
be used for detection. This work does not propose new detection methods, but 
explains how existing detection methods can help incident response and forensics. 
 Operating system resources that are used by the extension are minimal and hence, 
performance can be measured based on the time it takes to open the web page. 
1.7. Limitations 
The limitations of the study can be stated as follows: 
 The browser used is Firefox 3.0.15. As a result, the system has not been analyzed 
in other browsers like Internet Explorer, Google chrome etc. The reason is that the 
concept is based on the Firefox extension ‘NoScript’ that was mentioned above. 
 Only cross-site scripting attacks have been detected and logged. 
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 The extensive nature of the World Wide Web means that not all categories of 
websites will be covered. 
 The analysis has been logged in a MySQL database. 
 The data being logged includes the malicious end website, timestamp, IP address 
of the machine, the script in question and the malicious end host, if any, which 
was called by the script. 
 The study has been carried out on a Windows platform. 
1.8. Delimitations 
 Other forms of web application security concerns, apart from cross-site scripting, 
such as buffer overflows, SQL injection etc. have not been looked into. 
 The implementation has not been tested on any other operating system other than 
Windows. 
 Security issues related to the database have not been addressed in this study. 
1.9. Summary 
This chapter provided a primer into the research conducted. The main focus is on 
how a web application attack can be logged after it is detected. Cross site scripting as a 
web application attack has been chosen as a topic for study, mainly due to the existing 
concerns about cross site scripting today. The chapters ahead will discuss an existing 
system for detecting web application attacks and how the additional feature of logging 
can be added and the performance issues around it. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
The thesis research question is - Can a Firefox web browser efficiently log a 
cross-site scripting attack? Security gaps of Javascript have been a matter of concern and 
are widely discussed (Hendrickx, 2003). This thesis primarily focuses on cross-site 
scripting attacks that occur due to lack of secure coding techniques such as escaping 
potentially harmful characters. Even constructs such as eval () can contain other harmful 
code that may execute while browsing and can compromise the client. The threats that 
Javascript can pose in terms of cross site scripting are discussed by Alme (2009) in a 
McAfee white paper. The need for further security measures to be incorporated into 
Javascript forms one of the basic motivations of this research. 
2.2. Javascript Scrutiny 
 The following analysis begins with the argument as to why this thesis is relevant 
to the field of web application security and is justified by three of the articles. Some more 
examples that support the idea are provided. The penultimate part of the analysis deals 
with issues relating to managing large amounts of data. Finally, a tangential issue 
plaguing the area of web security is discussed. 
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 Livshits and Guarnieri (2009) proposed a system called GATEKEEPER which 
combines policy enforcement along with the points-to analysis of Javascript. It is 
an effective means for policy enforcement to prevent web-based attacks and 
ensure safe web-browsing. These concepts have their application in research areas 
like code optimization, debugging etc. 
 An effective audit system in combination with an Intrusion Detection System was 
presented to monitor Javascript in the Mozilla web browser by Hallaraker and 
Vigna (2005). Process execution overhead increased as result of auditing but it 
achieved the focus of study, which was detection of insecure Javascript 
components 
 The research by Ofuonye and Miller (2008) gives an insight into using code 
instrumentation techniques to rewrite any malicious Javascript code that violates 
the defined policies. It is a technique that can be used when the Javascript 
vulnerability to be detected is known. 
 
 The first two papers explain methods to detect typical malicious Javascript 
constructs (excluding the eval () function). But these malicious constructs can be 
embedded in the eval () function and can be executed at run time. In such a scenario, 
these systems might fail. One solution could be to have a policy to block any calls to the 
eval () function. However this defeats the purpose of having an eval () function in 
Javascript; eval () has its uses and blocking it entirely is not a viable option. An approach 
is required by which the contents of eval () can be analyzed at run time and can be 
changed if they are found to be malicious or vulnerable. Ofuonye and Miller (2008) 
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provide an insight into how this can be done. The concept of code instrumentation (i.e., 
rewriting the part of code that is identified as malicious) is suggested as a solution. One 
approach that can be adopted is that if the analyzed Javascript contains any call to eval() 
function, it should be analyzed before the browser evaluates it. If the evaluation finds no 
threats, the code can be allowed to execute. Otherwise the system must alert the user and 
log this event. 
 Eval () has been merely used as an example here for explaining the concept. 
However, this work uses the overall concept explained above. To restate the summary of 
chapter 1, an existing Firefox extension called “NoScript” is described in chapter 3 as it 
forms an important part of the methodology. Sanitizing malicious code in run time is an 
important step in the detection process, which is used by the extension and is also used in 
this study. 
2.3. Real Time Web Traffic Capture for Forensic Investigation 
Ahmed, Hussain and Raza (2009) proposed a system that is an effective way to 
enforce web policies in the corporate sector. It also supports the idea of collecting web 
browsing information in real time and processing it proactively. The authors provide a 
method to log web browsing activities of employees in an organization that can be used 
for forensic investigation as well. This justifies the importance of logging vital data when 
Javascript code is analyzed. If there is an investigation of a cybercrime incident, this 
approach will help in getting data captured in real time. Here, it is important to identify 
which data we need to capture. IP address is the most critical data. In addition to that, 
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capturing timestamps is vital too. Once the necessary data has been ported into a 
database, concerned personnel can analyze it by using appropriate statistical tools. 
The aim of this thesis is to serve as a proof of concept for such an effort, to 
analyze a few advantages of such a system from a cyber forensics standpoint and to study 
the performance aspects while loading a web page. 
2.4. Efficient Management of a Large Database 
 Kamara et al. (2003) proposed concepts that can be extremely useful for firewall 
developers and testers. The main aim was to arrive at a matrix that linked firewall 
vulnerability cause and effects with the firewall operation. It is really helpful in 
resource allocation and avoiding errors in implementation and installation. 
 Bertino et al. (2007) presented an effective approach to detect SQL injection by 
using anomaly based detection. The use of the data mining concept – “association 
rule mining” is a novel means to form filtering rules. 
 Jayaraman et al. (2008) used the strong concept of data structures in mining a 
large biometric database.  
 Debnath et al. (2008) presented an approach which ensured that DBAs would 
focus only on tuning those configuration parameters which have the most impact 
on system performance. This saves considerable time that the DBAs would 




 Storing of analysis, if a cross-site script attack occurs, is done in real time in this 
particular work. This means that the database will increase on a regular basis and it is 
important to manage this large data. These papers provide good background on this. 
Similar to how Bertino et al. (2007) and Jayaraman et al. (2008) stress identifying only 
the critical parameters and working around them, the database that is proposed to be built 
should be tuned to resolve only those parameters that are highly critical to the 
application.  
2.5. A Tangential Problem 
The concept of automatic updating of antivirus signature is important as it allows 
the new signatures to be instantly loaded by avoiding the time delay in manual updating. 
The study done by Badhusha et al. (2001) provides an implementation of this concept. 
The concept of active networks was used to build a system that proactively updated the 
antivirus signatures on end user systems instead of the users having to manually 
download the new signature. 
This study supports the case for a relevant question as follows: “Can updating of 
signature based systems be done using results from vulnerability analysis of websites?” 
The idea here is to make use of the Javascript analysis that would be logged. If there is a 
new entry in the table, this new signature must be automatically updated by the software. 
This will no doubt be a large scale effort. But initially, the antivirus provider may want to 
implement this system for a small geography and then scale it up. The main advantage 
here is that signature updates will happen rapidly, simply because of the large number of 
web users. As a result, the types of attacks that can be detected by the antivirus will 
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increase. The performance of the antivirus would correspondingly improve. This concept 
will be discussed further in the analysis section. Issues pertaining to privacy concerns 
must be taken care of too, but that is out of scope for this discussion. 
2.6. Summary 
This chapter went through the existing works done for mitigating threats posed by 
Javascript. Some analyzed policy violations while others attempted to rewrite the 
Javascript code itself. A number of works that used various data mining strategies to 
handle large amounts of data were discussed. Finally, a minor question that comes out of 
this study was discussed; the need for having automatic updates of antivirus and malware 
signatures was argued. This topic can be a detailed and independent research on its own. 
It has been mentioned in this chapter to highlight an advantage of this study but it is not a 
part of the study itself.
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CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Study Design 
This work is a quantitative study, employing an experimental design and using 
descriptive statistics. Fig 3.1 shows a flowchart representing the concept. There are no 
human subjects involved. The hypotheses are: 
Null Hypothesis: A system that logs details from a cross site scripting attack detected in 
the browser does not increase the time taken to open a webpage. 
Alternate Hypothesis: A system that logs details from a cross site scripting attack 
detected in the browser does increase the time taken to open a webpage. 
A one tailed matched pair t-test has been performed with α = 0.05 
3.2. Variables Measured 
The quantity that has been measured is the time taken to open an individual 
website. A website in a test environment was opened in the Firefox 3.0.15 web browser 
with the detection and logging mechanisms activated as well as deactivated. Time taken 
to open a website with and without the mechanisms has been calculated (in 
microseconds) using a standard timer function written in Java. Analysis has been done on 
this data to understand the overhead in opening a website introduced by the detection and 
logging mechanisms. The variables are enlisted as follows: 
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Independent Variable: Status of detection and logging mechanisms (Active or Inactive) 
Dependent Variable: Time taken for a web page to load 
 
 




The sampling method chosen is convenience sampling. The reason is the huge 
number of websites on the internet. As on November 09, 2009, the total number of web 
pages is 21.69 billion based on an estimation model proposed by Maurice de Kunder 
(2007). This is an increase of almost 50% compared to the number estimated in 
November, 2007. The time limitations of the thesis would make it infeasible to identify 
representative websites, the results from which can be generalized to the entire World 
Wide Web. This would also be inaccurate owing to the differences in the content of each 
website. 
As a result, data has been collected from a test environment. This includes a 
dummy website similar to a bulletin board or a blog. The details are given in the next 
subsection. 
3.3.1. Test Environment 
 MySQL database (Version 5.1.43) for logging. 
 Apache Tomcat server (Version 6.0.18) on a Windows 7 host, running 11 virtual 
hosts. One victim host running a mock bulletin board/ blog application and 10 
attacker hosts. A javascript function is called when a cross site script attack is 
detected. Appendix A provides complete system details. 
 Different tags were used as potentially malicious code to be sanitized. Some of 
them include <script /> and <img src = “”/> tags. These tags can be found as standard test 
cases provided by OWASP (2010, January 16) and by RSnake (n.d.). They are a part of 
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standard cheat codes that testers can use to test an application for XSS. The complete list 
of tags that have been used is given in table 3.1. 
Table 3.1  




1 <SCRIPT SRC = "" /> An external and helpful script can be run from the 
location specified in src. But this could point to an 
attacker's malicious script. 
2 <IMG SRC = "" /> Image tag can get external image from the location 
specified in src. But this could also point to an 
attacker's malicious script. 
3 <SCRIPT/SRC = "" /> More relevant to IE and Gecko rendering engines that 
allows a slash between the tag and parameter. 
4 <BODY 
BACKGROUND= ""> 
Similar to Sr. Nos. 1 and 2, the location within double 
quotes can point to an attacker's script. 
5 <IMG DYNSRC = ""> 
6 <IMG LOWSRC =""> 
7 <BGSOUND SRC 
=""> 
8 <LAYER SRC = "">  
17 
 
 In this work, the sanitization happens on these tags when the javascript function 
detects the “<” and “>” characters, which are escaped to “&lt;” and “&gt;”. This prevents 
the browser from evaluating the malicious script as a regular script and just displays it on 
the webpage. Appendix B shows the source code of this function. 
 The solution is designed to stop the cross site script attack and log it into a 
database. The database chosen for this purpose is MySQL. This solution is designed 
keeping in mind existing cross site script attack detection systems. The javascript 
function provided in appendix B can be applied to these existing systems; NoScript is one 
such system that is explained in the next sub-section. One advantage of NoScript is its 
open source nature that allows a transparent understanding of the system. 
3.3.2. NoScript 
 NoScript is an open-source Firefox add-on released under the GPL (GNU Public 
License), which provides additional security while browsing the web on a Firefox 
browser. It aims to disable executable web content like Javascript and Java by default, 
however, a user can white-list a particular website to enable these contents (Maone, n. d. 
b).  
 Maone (n. d. a) and Maone (n. d. b) provide most of NoScript’s documentation, 
which are the FAQ and features sections respectively. A few of the features mentioned in 
their documentation can be summarized as follows: 
1. Java, silverlight, flash and other plugins 
Along with javascript, NoScript can also block java, silverlight, flash and other 
plugins on untrusted sites (Maone, n. d. b). 
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2. Untrusted blacklist 
Certain sites that users do not trust can be added to a blacklist which causes 
NoScript to block any kind of malicious scripts from that domain. 
3. Anti XSS protection 
XSS or cross site scripting is a web application attack where an attacker causes a 
script to run in an unsuspecting user’s browser. In other words, an attacker can 
cause scripts to run from a site of their choice into the victim’s site. NoScript 
provides protection against such kinds of attacks. NoScript protects against Type 
0, Type 1 and Type 2 XSS attacks, thus ensuring full protection while browsing. 
 This work draws inspiration from the anti-XSS measures in NoScript. NoScript 
checks for XSS, sanitizes the attack and show the user a small message saying that the 
attack was filtered. Figure 3.2 shows such a message (Refer to the browser’s information 








Figure 3.2 XSS filtering in NoScript. Adapted from “NoScript - JavaScript/Java/Flash 
blocker for a safer Firefox experience! - features – InformAction” by G. Maone, n.d. b, 
retrieved from http://noscript.net/features 
 As mentioned previously, the concept described in this thesis is that once an XSS 
attack has been detected and sanitized, it is logged in a database. Applying this to 
NoScript, NoScript’s anti-XSS measure may be slightly modified to log it into a database 
that can be monitored. To be precise, a function similar to the one in appendix B can be 
added in a file in NoScript called “RequestWatchdog.js”. As NoScript is open-source, the 
source code comes along with its installation (Maone, n. d. a). Hence, future work in this 
regards is recommended, especially with more focus on the code. Doing so will be very 
helpful from an incidence response and cyber forensics standpoint. The discussions in 
chapter 5 will further clarify this. 
20 
 
3.4. Table in MySQL Database for Logging 
 A table named ‘test_logging’ was created in a MySQL database into which logs 
were inserted once a malicious javascript function was sanitized. The definition of the 
table can be seen in appendix D.  
The table contains fields for IP address, script, time stamp and suspect URL. The 
IP address is the IP address of the machine that was targeted, the script is the malicious 
javascript that was sanitized, the time stamp is the exact time at which the script was 
sanitized (provided by a javascript Date() object) and the suspect URL is the malicious 
end host, if any, that the script was calling. 
3.5. Summary 
 In this chapter, the design method for the thesis was described as quantitative 
research not involving human subjects, employing an experimental design. The quantity 
that is measured is the time taken to open a web page with and without the cross-site 




CHAPTER 4. DATA 
4.1. Collection of Samples 
 There were two sets of samples collected each having 40 observations. All 
observations have been collected from random clients made to access the website at 
different times. 
 The first set of data is collected to determine the time taken for the website to load 
in the absence of the above mentioned solution (given in table 4.1) while the second set is 
to determine the time taken for the website to load in the presence of the above 
mentioned solution (given in table 4.2). The times taken give an indication of the 
overhead caused by the solution. 
4.2. Page Load Times with and without New Feature 
 A matched pair t-test for the observations presented in tables 4.1 and 4.2 will help 
in inferring about the page load time in presence of the solution, because in principle a 
matched pair works well for two datasets which represent two different conditions (e.g., 
before and after) of the same subject under study (Moore, McCabe & Craig, 2009). The 
results from the test have been discussed in the next chapter. The data presented has two 
columns: IP address from which the malicious website was opened and time taken for the 
webpage to load, in microseconds. 
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Table 4.1  
Page load times in the absence of proposed solution 
Sr. No IP address Page Load Time (microseconds) 
1 IPADDRESS1 340 
2 IPADDRESS1 213 
3 IPADDRESS1 160 
4 IPADDRESS1 148 
5 IPADDRESS1 93 
6 IPADDRESS1 96 
7 IPADDRESS1 96 
8 IPADDRESS1 139 
9 IPADDRESS1 73 
10 IPADDRESS1 71 
11 IPADDRESS1 131 
12 IPADDRESS2 139 
13 IPADDRESS2 141 
14 IPADDRESS2 137 
15 IPADDRESS2 144 
16 IPADDRESS2 144 
17 IPADDRESS2 149 
18 IPADDRESS2 109 
19 IPADDRESS2 121 
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Sr. No IP address Page Load Time (microseconds) 
20 IPADDRESS2 169 
21 IPADDRESS2 79 
22 IPADDRESS2 124 
23 IPADDRESS2 132 
24 IPADDRESS2 125 
25 IPADDRESS2 130 
26 IPADDRESS2 121 
27 IPADDRESS3 76 
28 IPADDRESS3 71 
29 IPADDRESS3 63 
30 IPADDRESS3 113 
31 IPADDRESS3 54 
32 IPADDRESS3 73 
33 IPADDRESS3 74 
34 IPADDRESS3 75 
35 IPADDRESS3 71 
36 IPADDRESS3 49 
37 IPADDRESS3 74 
38 IPADDRESS3 46 
39 IPADDRESS3 73 
40 IPADDRESS3 48 
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Table 4.2  
Page load times in the presence of proposed solution 
Sr. No IP address Page Load Time (microseconds) 
1 IPADDRESS1 408 
2 IPADDRESS1 244 
3 IPADDRESS1 105 
4 IPADDRESS1 123 
5 IPADDRESS1 155 
6 IPADDRESS1 166 
7 IPADDRESS1 155 
8 IPADDRESS1 167 
9 IPADDRESS1 90 
10 IPADDRESS1 88 
11 IPADDRESS1 145 
12 IPADDRESS2 145 
13 IPADDRESS2 145 
14 IPADDRESS2 198 
15 IPADDRESS2 153 
16 IPADDRESS2 157 
17 IPADDRESS2 159 
18 IPADDRESS2 140 
19 IPADDRESS2 141 
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Sr. No IP address Page Load Time (microseconds) 
20 IPADDRESS2 179 
21 IPADDRESS2 151 
22 IPADDRESS2 136 
23 IPADDRESS2 213 
24 IPADDRESS2 143 
25 IPADDRESS2 134 
26 IPADDRESS2 139 
27 IPADDRESS3 82 
28 IPADDRESS3 58 
29 IPADDRESS3 90 
30 IPADDRESS3 291 
31 IPADDRESS3 56 
32 IPADDRESS3 53 
33 IPADDRESS3 86 
34 IPADDRESS3 86 
35 IPADDRESS3 82 
36 IPADDRESS3 58 
37 IPADDRESS3 80 
38 IPADDRESS3 53 
39 IPADDRESS3 84 
40 IPADDRESS3 54 
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4.3. Sample Logs Logged into Database 
 The logs explained here include the ones when a malicious script is sanitized. The 
program logs the malicious script into the database into the table test_logging that 
explained in section 3.4, along with the IP address, timestamp and the suspicious URL 
that the script was calling. Table 4.3 represents a few sample entries from this log file. 
This data provides important information about the script and the time of attack. 
Table 4.3  
Sample logs logged into database 
Sr. 
No 
IP address Suspected script Time stamp Suspect URL 





Tue Feb 23 2010 
13:55:09 GMT-









Tue Feb 23 2010 
13:55:09 GMT-










Tue Feb 23 2010 
13:55:09 GMT-











Tue Feb 23 2010 
13:55:09 GMT-









IP address Suspected script Time stamp Suspect URL 





Tue Feb 23 2010 
13:55:09 GMT-










Tue Feb 23 2010 
13:55:09 GMT-










Tue Feb 23 2010 
13:55:09 GMT-










Tue Feb 23 2010 
13:55:09 GMT-










Tue Feb 23 2010 
13:55:09 GMT-










Tue Feb 23 2010 
13:55:09 GMT-








 In this chapter, the important data that were collected for hypothesis testing were 
explained. The three crucial data are time taken for the webpage to load in the presence 
of the new feature, time taken for the webpage to load in the absence of the new feature 
and the logs that were logged into the database. Results from analysis and related 




CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
5.1. Results from Matched Pair t-test 
 A matched pair t-test was run to do significance testing of the hypothesis stated in 
chapter 3. The data described in chapter 4 was input into SAS. Table 5.1 shows the 
output of matched pair t-test from SAS. 
Table 5.1  
Output from matched pair t-test in SAS 
Sr. No. Statistic Value 
1 N 40 
2 Degrees of Freedom 39 
3 t-value 3.85 
4 P-value 0.0002 
Note. N = number of observations 
  
As can be seen, the obtained t-value was 3.85 which gave a P-value of 
approximately 0.0002. As mentioned in chapter 3, α was chosen as 0.05, which means P-
value < α. Hence the null hypothesis is rejected. So, the data shows that a system that 
logs details from a cross site scripting attack detected in the browser does increase the 
time taken to open a webpage. It is however important to note a few more points about 
time taken to open websites. Nielsen (1993) notes the following: 
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 0.1 second is about the limit for having the user feel that the system is reacting 
instantaneously, meaning that no special feedback is necessary except to display 
the result.  
1.0 second is about the limit for the user's flow of thought to stay uninterrupted, 
even though the user will notice the delay. Normally, no special feedback is 
necessary during delays of more than 0.1 but less than 1.0 second, but the user 
does lose the feeling of operating directly on the data.  
10 seconds is about the limit for keeping the user's attention focused on the 
dialogue. For longer delays, users will want to perform other tasks while waiting 
for the computer to finish, so they should be given feedback indicating when the 
computer expects to be done. Feedback during the delay is especially important if 
the response time is likely to be highly variable, since users will then not know 
what to expect. (p. 135) 
 In this work, the average webpage load time in the absence of the detecting and 
logging functions is 112 microseconds while the average webpage load time in the 
presence of the detecting and logging functions is 135 microseconds. This means that 
effectively, the webpage load time has increased by 20%. It can be seen that the time 
taken to open the web site in the test environment with and without the detecting and 
logging functions is much less than the 1st criteria (i.e., response time <= 0.1 seconds). 
Comparable performance can be expected in other weblogs and websites which have 
similar page sizes to be served. At the time of the tests, it should be noted that browser 
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extensions, such as NoScript, were not running. If the javascript function is integrated 
into NoScript and the timings noted, then there would be more factors to be considered 
while calculating overhead in addition to NoScript’s anti-XSS protection. These include 
features which are given by Maone (n. d. b). 
 If the percentage increase in times were to be applied to the 2nd criteria, it can be 
seen that for web pages that serve content in 8.33 seconds, the additional over head 
would cause the content to be served in approximately 10 seconds. This is still less than 
the limit given in the 3rd criteria, which confirms that a user need not be given any special 
messages.  
 If the time for serving web page content goes beyond these values, it is 
recommended to display a message to the user about the time remaining for the page to 
load, as mentioned in the 3rd criteria. This comes down to a trade-off between 
performance of the system and the desired level of security. If a website has placed high 
priority on security and can forego a certain loss in performance by allowing some 
additional overhead, the system described in this work would be a good tool to employ.  
5.2. Logs Collected 
 The logs collected give information about the following parameters at the time of 
the attack: 




 The script that was sanitized. This helps in further semantic analysis of the 
malicious script. 
 The time stamp at the time of the attack. 
 The end host or domain that the script was calling. This helps in knowing 
the domains that are suspicious. 
 These details were entered into a table in a MySQL database, as explained in 
section 3.4. The logging activity resulted in a table of 1755 rows inserted in 185 seconds 
occupying 9 KB on the disk. This corresponds to a throughput of 0.0486 KB/sec. The 
bulletin board application served a webpage of minimum size of 1.72 KB when no user 
comments were posted and of maximum size of 8 KB when there were 41 user 
comments. The throughput to the database observed is small with respect to the size of 
the webpage being served. Hence, speed of general web browsing was not seen to be 
affected.  
5.3. Forensic Importance: Frequency Analysis 
 Frequency analysis refers to identifying which host was called by the malicious 
script and how many times. This exercise helps in identifying hosts that are obviously 
suspicious so that the company’s policies can be designed to block those hosts. As 
explained in the previous sections, there were 10 suspicious hosts that the test scripts 
were calling. A frequency analysis of the 10 hosts generated a frequency distribution as 




Table 5.2  
Frequency analysis of suspect domains 












 The tests carried out resulted in domain8 being called maximum number of times 
followed by domain7. So, a policy maker would want to ensure maximum restrictions 
placed on these 2 domains compared to the other domains. An ordered bar graph for the 











Figure 5.1 Ordered bar graph for suspect domains frequency analysis 
5.4. Forensic Importance: Semantic Analysis 
 Semantic analysis, in this work, refers to studying the type of script along with the 
time stamp that was used for the cross site scripting attack. Some existing works done by 
Stallard and Levitt (2003) and Lin (2008) point out to the use of semantic checking of log 
files. By doing so, a prototype decision tree can be generated which can give forensics 
experts an effective guide in interpreting logs and arriving at results. The decision tree 
checks for certain behavior and depending on the outcome of the check, a decision can be 
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taken for e.g. non-malicious or malicious. One way of constructing the decision tree can 
as given below. 
  Before the system logs an XSS attack, it can set a priority value that indicates the 
seriousness of that attack. It can take values like “low”, “medium” and “high” based on 
an existing set of signatures. A forensic analyst, who examines the logs, can either 
conclude that all three levels of attacks are serious or only the ones with a “high” priority 
are serious. This helps in identifying if there is a false positive and in not reacting to 
them, if found. This decision can be taken with the help of decision trees similar to the 
ones shown in figures 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. 
 




Figure 5.3 Decision tree for medium priority log entry 
 
Figure 5.4 Decision tree for low priority log entry 
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 These decision trees help in weeding out the false positives or the less threatening 
attacks or those attacks which are within a company’s risk appetite. Also, researching on 
the scripts that are logged will lead to a better understanding of how XSS attacks occur 
and what measures can work against them. 
5.5. Privacy Concerns 
 Studying the privacy concerns is out of the scope of this research, but it is worth 
mentioning some points about the same. The proposed solution would be targeted to 
work in networks that are monitored such as a private company. Since such places would 
already be governed by existing policies for web browsing, it would be fair to say that 
appropriate policies can be incorporated within the existing policy framework. Policies 
for internet usage within a company are quite common. Integrating a few policies 
regarding the system just discussed into the internet usage policy can be an effective 
measure to take. 
5.6. Future Work and Recommendations 
 This study can be worked upon further. One direction for future work can be to 
include a wider gamut of websites. Studying websites that deliver web contents of 
varying sizes will cover a wider range of websites.  
The primary web application attack that was studied was XSS. However, similar 
principles can be applied to other types of web application attacks like SQL injection. It 
would be worthwhile to study how well different types of web application attacks can be 
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handled by such a system. Similar to this work, importance must be given to performance 
issues, when implementing such a system for other types of web application attacks. 
As described in the previous section, studying privacy related issues can aid in 
understanding and working around these issues. If a company is chosen as case study, 
knowing thoughts of employees as well as the employer will assist in identifying the most 
critical privacy issues. 
Currently, the error rates for such a system are not known. A dedicated study that 
identifies the false positives and false negatives of the system will also be beneficial. 
Knowing the error rates will help in conforming to the Daubert criteria for acceptance of 
Cyberforensics tools. Carrier (2003) has summarized the four points for satisfying 
Daubert criteria as follows: 
Testing: Can and has the procedure been tested? 
Error Rate: Is there a known error rate of the procedure? 
Publication: Has the procedure been published and subject to peer review? 
Acceptance: Is the procedure generally accepted in the relevant scientific 
community? (p.3) 
Carrier (2003) has pointed out to the usefulness of open source tools when it 
comes to meeting these guidelines. As stated earlier, one tool where this work can be 
applied was “NoScript” which is open source. Such tools provide for greater transparency 
and are easy for peer reviewing. The fact that source code is available to all and that the 
system is understood by users makes it easier for open source tools to satisfy the 
guidelines stated above. 
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In chapter 2, a mention was made about dynamic updating of antivirus logs. A 
previous work done by Badhusha et al (2001) corresponded to this idea. The concept 
presented in this work can be used to dynamically update signatures relating to web 
application attacks. As mentioned in chapter 2, dynamic updates will be beneficial as data 
can be collected by a large number of users who access the web in the presence of this 
system. This will ensure a better prevention of web application attacks by antivirus 
softwares. 
5.7. Conclusion 
 This study presented a system that logs cross site scripting attacks detected in a 
Firefox web browser. This system has its uses in the cyber forensics field, namely 
through frequency analysis of malicious end websites and through semantic checking of 
log files. This would prove extremely beneficial for forensic analysts in making 
decisions, as was also seen in the works done by Stallard and Levitt (2003) and Lin 
(2008). As mentioned in section 1.4, a challenge faced in cyber forensics is reliability and 
validity of the evidence gathered and analyzed (Kessler, 2009). Additional logs such as 
the ones described in this work can be expected to prove beneficial. Further 
improvements were suggested while discussing possible future works, which included 
analyzing other forms of web application attacks and also ascertaining the error rates of 
such systems. 
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Appendix A. System Details 
A single system was used to serve the virtual hosts on Apache Tomcat as well as 
to run MySQL database for logging. Its details are as follows: 
 Operating System: Windows 7 Home Premium 
 Manufacturer: Hewlett-Packard 
 Model: HP-G60 530 US Notebook PC 
 Processor: Pentium (R) Dual-Core CPU T 4300 @ 2.10GHz 
 RAM: 3 GB 
















Appendix B. Javascript Function 
The following function has been used to sanitize a potentially malicious script and log to 
a server if an attack is detected. 
function chkmsg(s) 
{ 
var xhr = null; 
var myHost = ""; 
var newstr = s.replace("<","&lt;"); //check for unescaped characters 
newstr = newstr.replace(">","&gt;"); 
var start = s.indexOf("http"); 
var end = s.indexOf("\"",start+7); 




  if(s!=newstr) 
  { 
   var check = badUrl.indexOf("http://victim"); 
   if(check==-1) //if script was calling an external domain, log it 
    { 
     var currentTime = new Date(); 
     myHost = 
"http://log_server_domain/examples/dbInsert?param1="+s+"&param2="+newstr+"&para
m3="+currentTime+"&param4="+badUrl+"&param5="+navigator.appName; 
     document.write(unescape("%3Cscript src='" + 
myHost + "' type='text/javascript'%3E%3C/script%3E")); 
/*myHost contains URL of the log server. This value can be customized with the help of 
a properties file*/ 
    } 




  var txt="Host not found!!\n"; 
  txt+="Reason: "+err.description+"\n"; 
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This function calls a servlet named dbInsert to log into database. The source code 





















Appendix C. Servlet for Logging into Database 
The following servlet code is used to log a cross-site scripting attack that is 
detected. It inserts details into a table in MySQL called “test_logging”. This table is given 
in Appendix D. 
/** 
 * @(#)dbInsert.java 
 * 
 * 
 * @author vvnmithun 















public class dbInsert extends HttpServlet { 
    protected void doGet(HttpServletRequest request, HttpServletResponse response) 
    throws ServletException, IOException { 
     response.setContentType("text/html;charset=UTF-8"); 
        PrintWriter out = response.getWriter(); 
        System.out.println("dbInsert called"); 
        Connection con=null; 
        try { 
        Class.forName("com.mysql.jdbc.Driver").newInstance(); 
  con = 
DriverManager.getConnection("jdbc:mysql://localhost:3306/thesis","root","thesis"); 
  String oldScript = ""; 
  String sanitScript = ""; 
  String ipAddress = ""; 
  //Date today = new Date(); 
  String today = ""; 
  String hostName = ""; 
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  String badHost = ""; 
  String browserType = ""; 
  oldScript = request.getParameter("param1"); 
  sanitScript = request.getParameter("param2"); 
  ipAddress = request.getRemoteAddr(); 
  hostName = request.getRemoteHost(); 
  today = request.getParameter("param3"); 
  badHost = request.getParameter("param4"); 
  browserType = request.getParameter("param5"); 
  String query0 = null; 
  query0 = "insert into test_logging values 
('"+hostName+"','"+oldScript+"','"+today+"','"+badHost+"');"; 
  Statement stmt0 = con.createStatement(); 
        stmt0.executeUpdate(query0); 
     stmt0.close(); 
        con.close(); 
        System.out.println("DB insertions done"); 
     } 
      
           catch (ClassNotFoundException cE) { 
            System.out.println("Class Not Found Exception: "+ cE.toString()); 
            try{ 
            con.close(); 
            } 
            catch (SQLException e2) { 
            System.out.println("SQL Exception: "+ e2.toString()); 
            } 
        } catch(Exception e) 
           { 
                   System.out.println("Error"+e); 
                   try{ 
                   con.close(); 
                   } 
                   catch (SQLException e2) { 
                System.out.println("SQL Exception: "+ e2.toString()); 
                   } 
           } 
           finally { 
            out.close(); 
         }  




Appendix D. MySQL Table 
The MySQL create statement used for the table described in chapter 3, section 4 
is given below. This table serves as the log. 
CREATE TABLE thesis.test_logging ( 
  ip_address varchar(200) DEFAULT NULL, 
  script varchar(200) DEFAULT NULL, 
  time_stamp varchar(200) DEFAULT NULL, 
  suspect_url varchar(200) DEFAULT NULL, 
) ENGINE=InnoDB DEFAULT CHARSET=latin1;
